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2006 CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL HORMESIS SOCIETY
STRESS RESPONSE MECHANISMS: FROM SINGLE CELLS TO
MULTINATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Richard J. Pech  Graduate School of Management, Faculty of Law and
Management, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
 Can a literal comparison be made between biological phenomena in organisms and
phenomena in human organizations? The evidence provided by simplified but useful
examples appears to suggest that a phenomenon simulating hormesis can and does occur
in organizational contexts. Similarities between stress response behaviors of organisms
and stress response behaviors in organizations are discussed. Cellular stress response
mechanisms stimulate and repair, as well as defend the organism against further attacks.
Organizational hormesis describes actions that stimulate the organization by increasing its
focus and protecting it against future attacks. The common aim for the organism as well
as the organization is to increase the probability of survival. The following describes exam-
ples of organizational survival that demonstrate a number of hormetic parallels between
organisms and organisations.
INTRODUCTION
The idea that organizations can be likened to living organisms is not
new. For example Keeley, (1980); Young, (1990); Bloom, (1995); and
Pech, (2001) provides only a short list of authors who have compared or
contrasted behavior within organizations, or super-organisms as Bloom
(1995) has termed organizations, to that of a living organism. Can a lit-
eral comparison be made between biological phenomena in organisms
and phenomena in human organizations? And if so, can phenomena in
living organisms provide lessons for organisations?
Calabrese and Baldwin’s (2001) research demonstrating that exposure
to small levels of some toxins may be beneficial to organisms, has sparked
an interest in identifying whether parallels can be drawn between the ben-
eficial effects of toxic exposure to larger collective organic structures such
as organizations. Calabrese and Baldwin (2001) argue that some organ-
isms exposed to small doses of toxins will overcompensate and readapt,
thereby providing two advantages for the newly adapted organism:
1. ensuring that the repair was adequately accomplished in a timely
fashion,
2. ensuring some measure of protection against a subsequent and more
massive onslaught. 
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If similar hormetic effects can be identified in organizations, it will
transform the organism-organization analogy from a simple abstract com-
parison to one with more literal implications. The difficulty lies in identi-
fying whether there is a biologically plausible comparison between organ-
isms and organized human structures - organizations. The example of
hormesis may provide a useful starting point. This requires firstly identi-
fying comparable hormetic phenomena, as well as identifying whether
toxic exposure in the biological sense is comparable with toxic exposure
within an organizational context. Pech and Oakley (2005) have argued
that this is certainly the case, citing examples of organizations that were
once exposed to levels of ‘toxicity’, and as a consequence emerging
stronger and better equipped to survive subsequent onslaughts.
CAN AN ORGANIZATION BE LIKENED TO AN ORGANISM?
Cognitive psychologist Andy Clark (1997) uses the example of slime
molds to compare organisms operating as organizations. He discusses the
species dictyostelium discoideum whose life-cycle starts as an individual
amoeba-like cell (myxamoebae). The cells feed on bacteria and grow and
divide—until food sources run out. At that point the cells converge into
something resembling a slug, which then searches for an appropriate
source of nourishment, at which point it again changes form into a stalk
and fruiting body that restarts the cycle propagating spores with a fresh
population of myxamoebae. 
Dawkins (2004) discusses examples of cooperative behavior such as
the Great Barrier Reef, where the clustering of complex three dimen-
sional structures of the coral organisms inflate their effective surface for
biological activity. Each organism builds on the skeletons of previous gen-
erations, resulting in the construction of massive eco structures. Dawkins
delves into the origins of life on Earth, arguing that bacteria may have
clustered together during the early stages of the evolutionary process, sac-
rificing their individuality for the advantages offered by evolving within a
larger collective, perhaps to form the first eukaryotic cells containing
hereditary information and thus kick starting evolution by natural selec-
tion. As with the construction of the Great Barrier Reef, it may be specu-
lated that larger organisms are the consequence of cooperation, joining,
and subsuming of smaller organisms to form a competitively fitter entity.
Perhaps organizations can be viewed similarly, with a joining and sub-
suming of individual entities for the beneficial purposes of the organiza-
tional body and its stakeholders.
Bloom (1995) goes further when he describes society’s cooperative
behavior and our communication of information as a neural net (p. 140).
He argues that humans develop interdependencies, eating food that is
grown and processed by complete strangers in countries far away from
the point of purchase. An individual may develop a medical break-
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through that enables thousands of complete strangers to benefit from its
application. Similarly, human networks may conspire to compete with
other networks. Recent aggressive activities by religious fundamentalist
groups seeking to displace governments and/or ideologies may provide a
painful example. Sometimes competitive behavior between groups can
also be used in a positive manner, such as the use of sports teams for fos-
tering relations between nations and people with conflicting views (table
tennis in China, rugby in South Africa).
THE INFLUENCE OF THE MIND/BRAIN 
These collectives and networks of individuals may act as hosts for what
could be termed as thought contagion or a virus of the mind. One exam-
ple may be found in the manner in which society or groups sometimes
unquestioningly follow the tenets of myths buried deeply within the mists
of time. Dennett (2003, p. 306) explains, 
... tradition usually has a free ride ... Doctrines that are endorsed by
tradition should be left unexamined if at all possible, people are
inclined to think, as a matter of tactical wisdom, since it will only stir
up a hornet’s nest if we question them. And so traditional thinking
lives on, largely unchallenged, and accretes a pearly coating of spuri-
ous invulnerability over the years.
Clark (1997) explains how the brain, while being critical to human
productivity, is more of a mediator of intellectual processes and products
rather than its sole and direct source and inspiration. The brain utilises
complex feedback loops encompassing external props and media such as
books, databases, and notes, as well as other minds. The brain collects
fragmentary pieces of knowledge and reorganises them with existing and
incoming relevant information through repeated interactions to produce
‘good ideas’ and to encourage caution and critical reflection before
implementing ‘bad ideas’. This supportive knowledge and feedback
learning process could be regarded as an enlargement on the pioneering
Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky’s (1978) suggestion of a scaffolding
effect. The knowledge with which a society surrounds itself and in which
it embeds itself, provides the scaffolding to support its cultural decision-
making edifice. Such a ‘thought’ scaffold provides an external memory
field, motivating and directing human actions—and inactions as one. 
Donald (2002, p. 316) describes the external memory field that pro-
vides the internal structures (the laws, boundaries, rules, procedures, val-
ues) for decision scaffolding as a type of cultural Trojan Horse that can
be easily implanted within the mind. He claims that this Trojan Horse can
‘play our cognitive instrument, directing our minds to predetermined
end states along a set course’ (p. 316). He argues that this can make the
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human mind externally programmable to an extraordinary degree, and
that we are ‘married to culture and fated to play out its algorithm in our
conscious acts’ (p. 316). 
Donald (2002) further claims that the ‘nature and range of human
conscious experience are no longer a biological given. Rather they
depend on a somewhat unpredictable chemistry of brain and culture,
whereby the processes of mind can be endlessly rewritten and rearranged
by cultural forces ... Evolution has nudged us in this direction, interlock-
ing brain and culture, toward the absorption of individuals by communi-
ties of mind’ (p. 321-322). Every gathering of people expresses elements
of culture providing the construct from which each individual receives
instructions regarding behaviour, expectations, standards, outputs, what
matters and what does not. Words, symbols, gestures, narratives, these are
the defining parts of culture; they paint the colours and provide the glue
that sustains its internal message. They are also the elements that facili-
tate mimicking behavior, reinforcing and spreading specific rules and
unquestioned traditions of a culture amongst those who are susceptible
to its message. This message replication and mimicking can sometimes be
likened to the behaviors of a viral agent (see Pech & Slade, 2004).
Edelman and Tononi (2000, p. 29) reinforce Donald’s argument when
they point out that consciousness cannot be explained from a purely bio-
logical perspective, as our conscious state requires interactions with the
world as well as others, all of which serve to create scaffolding around our
decision processes. This scaffolding comprises the culture, the rules, the
values, and the ambitions and hopes of society. Schwartz and Begley
(2002) add another dynamic when attempting to understand human cog-
nition and that is the powerful influence of emotion. All of these elements
combine to influence decision behavior in the super organism. People
who comprise the super organism could therefore be viewed as program-
mable parts, each working independently and yet cooperatively to fulfil
the ‘mission’ embedded within the organisation’s cultural scaffold. 
While people work together to achieve an organizational goal, there
is an underlying biological need for each individual to reduce a sense of
uncertainty that he or she may experience. The brain’s ability to cate-
gorise and recall information is partially driven by the need for this
‘reduction of uncertainty’ (Edelman & Tononi, 2000, p. 29). Wilson
(2004) explains that groups of individual organisms can have, or can be
thought of, as having minds in something like the way in which individ-
ual organisms themselves can have minds (p. 267). This collective psy-
chology provides the individual with decision scaffolds that direct, guide,
and generally serve to reduce the element of uncertainty that may other-
wise accrue if left to think and act alone. The evolutionary process may
have equipped such collectives with the capability to transform them-
selves to exploit or survive their environments. This may be likened to the
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manner in which the slime mold transforms from a slug-like creature to
a stalk and fruiting body, without conscious leadership or an articulated
set of instructions (except for the information provided in its DNA). 
The biological urge to reduce uncertainty in humans may result in an
overt expression of informational attraction. The information that is
attracted is then processed through a series of memory recognition fil-
ters, thereby shaping the level and intensity of the understanding that
eventuates. Group and cultural norms further aid in the interpretation of
information, removing uncertainty in the mind of the individual. This
may result in wisdom and learning but it may also produce narrow-mind-
edness and unquestioning loyalty to questionable beliefs.
THE GREATER COLLECTIVE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF HORMETIC
EFFECTS
Clark describes a concept he has called emergence. Clark (1997, p. 74)
divides the phenomenon of emergence into two distinct categories. The first,
direct emergence, occurs where the properties and relations between individ-
ual elements primarily take on a life of their own and environmental ele-
ments have only background influence. Clark’s notion of indirect emergence
describes the predominant influence of the environment in triggering
behaviours both individual and collective. The example of the slime mold
describes indirect emergence, as the pseudoplasmodium only changes
shape once it has found a location with adequate nourishment. Its envi-
ronment therefore prescribes the timing for each stage in its lifecycle.
Transformation of the shape or purpose of a collective could occur as
a consequence of Clark’s phenomenon of emergence. As an example,
people with a common outlook or cause may unite to further the goals of
that cause. They will reduce uncertainty by a number of strategies that
may range from objective and critical searches and evaluation of all per-
tinent information, through to adherence to dogma and unquestioning
loyalty to information from dubious sources. Their collective activity and
subsequent survival may be completely dependent on the impact that
Clark’s direct or indirect emergence has on their organization.
Using the example of a religiously-focused group, their ‘shape’ and
purpose may be influenced by direct emergence where they develop
rules, rituals, and hierarchies based on the tenets of their faith. Indirect
emergence may influence the shape of this group through some form of
sudden and violent persecution. Assuming the group survives the initial
onslaught, it now changes shape, pursuing its goals in a less open man-
ner, perhaps operating by stealth rather than the public forum. Survival
is dependent on the group’s ability to evolve in response to the pressures
under which it has suddenly found itself. Such pressures could be viewed
as toxic, having poisoned the ‘landscape’ to which the group had become
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acculturated. History is replete with examples, including Roman perse-
cutions of members of the Christian faith and the Nazi regime’s system-
atic extermination of the Jewish people. In these two examples members
of the collective suffered horrendously for their part in maintaining the
scaffolds of the culture to which they have been born or within which
they chose to live. The effects of the holocaust produced world-wide
revulsion and resulted in the re-establishment of the nation of Israel. This
could be viewed as a consequence of indirect emergence, with factors
external to those being persecuted facilitating the establishing of a new
nation in order to prevent recurring events. Direct emergence could also
be witnessed by the determination and perseverance of the Jewish people
against their persecutors, producing ever increasing levels of internal
cohesive activity in an attempt to establish a position of survival and self-
determined control.
It could be suggested that the above examples (simplified for the sake
of this argument) of super organisms struggling to survive in hostile envi-
ronments naturally reflect elements of hormetic phenomena. Calabrese
and Baldwin’s (2001) findings ‘suggest that hormetic effects represent
evolutionary-based adaptive responses to environmentally induced dis-
ruption in homeostasis’ (p. 353). Whether such disruptions are the con-
sequence of direct emergence (i.e. the splitting of the Catholic Church to
form an off-shoot that resulted in the establishment of the Anglican
Church), or indirect emergence (i.e. persecution of the Jewish people,
ultimately resulting in the establishment of the nation of Israel), such dis-
ruptions may arguably result in re-establishment of homeostasis and
adaptation. In the former example, England under the rule of Henry
VIII, was able to pursue its own interests without interference from the
last remnant of the Roman Empire, embodied within the form of the
Catholic Church. In the latter example, the Jewish people became legit-
imised as a recognised nation and were able to legally defend themselves
against further instances of persecution.
If viewed as organisms, both of the above examples demonstrate the
key elements of Calabrese and Baldwin’s (2001) four hormetic features:
1. disruption of homeostasis
2. overcompensation
3. re-establishment of homeostasis
4. adaptation.
The above examples describe instances where environmental ‘toxins’
initiated indirect emergence, prompting actions that have resulted in dis-
ruption of homeostasis. Each group was vulnerable but as a consequence
became involved in modifying their structure, behaviors, and their envi-
ronment, which could be viewed as deliberate acts of overcompensation.
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They then successfully re-established homeostasis, and adapted. Such
hormetic processes could be viewed as ‘healing with foresight’ as horme-
sis prepares and improves the organism’s ability to repel future and more
intense attacks. Toxic attacks and evolutionary development appear to be
interlinked in an ironic arms struggle. The phenomenon of hormesis
offers organisms an advantage in this struggle through the facilities of
adaptation and hardening of defences. Within the given context, the irony
lies in the fact that the attacking agent may inadvertently be responsible
for facilitating the success and greater longevity of its intended victim. 
FACILITATING RECOVERY THROUGH ORGANIZATIONAL HORMESIS 
Pech and Oakley (2005, p. 685) argue that the term hormesis
describes a specific organisational phenomenon of repair, overcompen-
sation, and adaptation that currently falls under a variety of loosely
defined terms including learning organisations, organisation development,
and change management. Eustress is sometimes referred to synonymously
with hormesis, however the focus on positive stress and its supposed ben-
efits, which remain an issue of contention (see Le Fevre, et al, 2003), sug-
gest that this only encapsulates one aspect of the hormetic phenomenon.
None of these terms accurately or adequately describe the repair and
adaptation processes that commence after disruption to homeostasis.
The key element for successful adaptation appears to be at the overcom-
pensation and adaptation stages. 
As an example, when Fujio Mitarai took over as CEO of Canon on
1995, he immediately reviewed the company’s profitability. He divested
the company of the personal-computer business, shortly followed by liq-
uid-crystal displays, photovoltaic batteries, and electric typewriters, as well
as three other non-profitable businesses. During the eleven years of his
tenure as CEO, Mitarai has transformed Canon from a debt-ridden and
rudderless company into the world’s largest manufacturer of office copy-
ing equipment, as well as deposing Sony as the world’s number 1 maker
of digital cameras. Canon’s share price has made a three-fold improve-
ment since 1995. Such radical recovery and business growth cannot be
simply explained away as learning, leadership, or clever change manage-
ment. Chandler (2006) explains that prior to Mitarai’s sudden rise to
CEO, Canon’s culture was dominated by scientists and technicians pur-
suing their own interests without regard for the rest of the company.
Money-losing projects staggered on year after year while factions fought
to take control. Mitarai literally ripped the organization apart, going
through it like a dose of poison, but he carefully ensured that core com-
petencies and core capability were never lost. He experimented with a
new manufacturing approach known as cell production that made con-
veyer belt production redundant. From a strategic perspective he:
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1. cut costs
2. created islands of strength 
3. increased production speed and, 
4. focused on competitor and market responsiveness.
Before Canon could move forward, it had to change its unproductive
and non-responsive culture. In hormetic terms Mitarai dramatically dis-
rupted homeostasis by severing unprofitable activities, causing shock
waves throughout Japan and great resistance within his own company.
Chandler (2006) claims that Mitarai had to wait two years for the ‘old
guard’ to move on before he could exert enough authority to make the
necessary changes. Mitarai’s restructuring of Canon mimicked toxic
exposure that created expectations of disaster for the company. The
‘dosage’ was however low enough to create the opposite effect, it jump-
started repair mechanisms that strengthened the company. In order to
assure the company’s recovery, Mitarai then overcompensated by increas-
ing the R&D budget, slashing inventories, increasing response speed, and
introducing new designs to market more quickly. Thus homeostasis was
re-established at a far higher level of focus and output, and adaptation
within its environment ensured that Canon would become a world leader
in its chosen markets. It could be speculated that Canon could not have
re-engineered itself into such a formidable player without toxic exposure,
which then initiated hormetic events, reflected by a subsequent strength-
ening of the organization.
When considering change, many firms may be tempted to minimise
or completely ignore one or more of the hormetic stages as they feel that
their recovery from crisis has been successfully managed. It is argued that
by ignoring stages of the hormetic process, firms will not experience
hormesis, and when confronted with further and more severe disrup-
tions, their level of vulnerability may be unnecessarily high as the follow-
ing example from Pech and Oakley (2005, p. 677) demonstrates. 
On February 9th 1990 Ronald Davis, President of the Perrier Group
of America learned that traces of benzene had been found in some of
their bottles. He immediately withdrew all Perrier bottles from distribu-
tion in North America. At this stage Davis knew few details of the cause
and magnitude of the problem when making his product recall decision.
Arguably Davis overcompensated, thus initiating one of the hormetic
stages. Perrier stated to the media that the product would be unavailable
for up to three months while a supposed problem with the production
line for North America was rectified. They claimed that an employee had
mistakenly used cleaning fluid containing benzene to clean machinery
on the production line (Freedman & King, 1990). A few days later all bot-
tled products around the globe had to be recalled as the company now
admitted that all production lines had been contaminated. Perrier’s slow
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return to the market (five months rather than the expected three) and
the adverse publicity surrounding the contamination as well as the dis-
covery that the company had lied about the cause as well as the duration
of the contamination, seriously undermined the company’s market share. 
Perrier’s crisis management plan failed to include the adaptation
stage. Instead they attempted to re-establish homeostasis through a prod-
uct recall and by lying to the media about the cause of the problem. On
their return to the market, Perrier found that an uncontrollable shift had
occurred in their environment. A number of aggressive competitors had
now established themselves in the bottled water market during their five-
month crisis and they were not about to retreat with Perrier’s return.
Although hindsight often gives critics a superior position from which to
base their advice, it is argued that the Perrier case provides an example
where a hormetic approach could perhaps have maintained or restored
the company’s original market position, or given it the capability to bet-
ter adapt to its altered environment. 
The phenomenon of hormesis suggests that repair and adaptation are
naturally occurring biological survival mechanisms. An argument has been
made that organizations are simply another form of organism. Distressed
firms, or organizations that find themselves in a toxic environment should
be given the same opportunity to enact and imitate this biological survival
mechanism. Liquidation should therefore be viewed as a strategy of last
resort. There may be a temptation to liquidate firms as a consequence of
severe disruptions, such as was nearly the case for Xerox when liquidation
was posited as the company’s best strategy for damage control in 2000. As
subsequent events at Xerox have demonstrated, a brush with ‘death’ may
have been the best thing to have happened to that company.
SIMULATING HORMETIC EFFECTS IN ORGANIZATIONS
How would an organization under attack or one that is emersed in a
toxic environment initiate a strategy simulating hormetic effects? Donald
(2002) has described the interlocking nature between mind and culture
as ‘communities of mind’ (p. 322). Such communities of mind have the
ability to change their shape, their purpose, and their mode of operation
(think back to the changes demonstrated by slime mold). Such commu-
nities are held together by information, whether it is communicated in
the form of DNA, religious teachings, or core business processes, infor-
mation provides identity, purpose, and heredity. 
Perhaps some organizations have become too precious about their
shape and activities, thereby ignoring the critical requirement of being
able to adapt. Management theorist Alfred Chandler once stated that
“structure follows strategy” (Chandler, 1962), yet organizations continue
to meander between strategies without reconsidering their shape. Before
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Mitarai, Canon grew product lines and special projects without examin-
ing its core structure in the context of its changing environment, Xerox
did the same until it was forced to re-examine itself and its intent after
2000. Organizations do not need to suffer the slowly accumulated and
progressive evolutionary changes that are forced upon organisms.
Organisms can only build incrementally on existing structures, thus lim-
iting their ability to adapt to changes in their environment. Organizations
can re-engineer themselves as and when required, and yet they often
choose to react to change by using incrementally-based responses, unnec-
essarily limiting themselves to an ‘organic’ range of actions. 
Organizational hormesis offers a solution. A low level injection of an
appropriate toxin could enable the organization to develop constructive
and appropriate response, repair, and adaptation mechanisms. This will
allow it to re-establish itself at a new and (when compared with competi-
tors) advantageous level of homeostasis through overcompensation and
adaptation, thus preparing itself for possible future attacks. Paul Rogers
and Marcia Blenko report findings from comprehensive global research
on high-performance organizations completed by business consulting
firm Bain & Co. Their research has identified that it is the firm’s internal
barriers that produce the main obstacle to growth (Rogers & Blenko,
2005, p. 135). This suggests that health (if growth can be viewed as an
indicator of health) is largely determined by the organization’s manage-
rial decision processes. Failure to recognize and exploit opportunities, or
to adapt to a changing environment, or to respond appropriately to an
attack, can be blamed largely on the actions or inactions of the firm’s
management. 
What steps can a manager initiate to maximize the benefits of horme-
sis in an organizational context? It has been recognised that hormesis
may be the consequence of cellular stress response mechanisms.
Resources are deployed against the attacking agent, resulting in a
stronger, healthier cell, in effect creating the opposite effect to that of
exposure to larger doses. Could organizations intentionally mimic such
complex biological defence mechanisms? 
This paper has argued that organizations are larger forms of living
organisms. Even the wide geographic dispersal of the multinationals
doesn’t preclude them from being categorised as organisms. They are
simply examples of organisms with far-reaching tentacles (or ‘hands’ if
that is a more acceptable term). Distance doesn’t hinder their ability to
achieve the mission of the collective, provided the structure, command
and control, and communication channels have been adapted for such
purposes. An exploratory mission to the outer reaches of the galaxy could
be regarded as advancement of the human endeavour, and it could be
regarded as growth of the human organism as it extends its influence and
impact across increasingly greater distances. The return of such a space
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mission contaminated with toxic alien biological agents could certainly
have calamitous consequences for the human species, potentially com-
municating its harmful effects from human to human as effectively as if
we were all one organism.
Organizational stress response mechanisms are generally initiated by
decision makers located in managerial positions, the equivalent of the
cell’s nerve centre. In 1990 David Packard, at the age of 80, came out of
retirement to turn Hewlett-Packard back into a profit-making business
from its then struggling and unprofitable position. His restructuring of
HP had an immediate impact on its competitor IBM, who responded to
their struggling position by laying off 20,000 staff in 1991 as well as
announcing their first annual loss in the firm’s 80 year history. The
announced loss was $2.8 billion! In 1992 another 20,000 staff lost their
jobs at IBM. 
IBM responded to its unprofitable status and the new competitive
behavior of Hewlett-Packard with a predictable pattern of layoffs that
failed to inspire or motivate remaining staff. Instead it triggered an exo-
dus of some of their best employees. IBM haemorrhaged, bleeding out
while Hewlett-Packard inoculated itself and bounced back stronger (IBM
did eventually recover but it took a long time and cost the firm a great
deal in staff morale and in lowered investor confidence). David Packard’s
interventions at HP resulted in the restructuring of the company into two
semi-autonomous divisions, and the abolition of management by com-
mittee, thereby increasing the firm’s decision speed. These changes
helped to make HP a leader in innovations and pricing standards (Pitta,
1993). HP appeared to experience hormetic effects by overcompensat-
ing, adapting to its evolving environment, and inoculating itself against
further onslaughts by competitors. In 2005 HP once again found itself in
difficulties with its new CEO Mark Hurd announcing major restructur-
ings. However, Fortune magazine has ranked HP as one of ten ‘sturdy
stocks’ for investors in 2006 (Birger & Stires, 2005), suggesting that HP
continues to maintain strong investor confidence. Such confidence could
perhaps be based on hormetic effects, as HP’s stress response mecha-
nisms have already proven themselves in the past.
Calabrese (2005) discusses a number of factors that have contributed
to the field of toxicology’s historical rejection of the concept of hormesis.
One of these factors he describes as ‘biological/societal implications not
appreciated nor anticipated (p. 651). Organizational researchers have yet
to recognize or acknowledge the presence of hormetic effects, possibly
because the counterintuitive principles and implications underlying the
hormetic phenomenon in organizations have also not been recognized
or appreciated. It could also be argued that because hormesis is a natu-
rally occurring defence mechanism; its stimulatory effect and reparative
overcompensation in organizations may only be recognized through a
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seemingly unconnected series of causes, actions, and effects. This may
mask hormetic phenomena. Unprepared or casual observers may incor-
rectly credit examples of business turnaround to leadership, or restruc-
turing, or change management, when the truth is far more complicated.
The anecdotal evidence provided in this paper arguing a case for the
existence of organizational hormesis requires empirical support.
Suggestions for initiating hormesis in organizations for the improvement
of organizational health and longevity would constitute a premature step
at this early stage, but the evidence to date does lend itself to infer the
existence of several stages and actions.
POTENTIAL APPLICATION
It may be hypothesised that hormetic effects in organizations may
occur under the following circumstances:
1. Disruption in the form of deliberate actions taken by managers or dis-
ruption due to a crisis or in response to unexpected changes in the
environment.
2. Restructuring that involves severing of liabilities or non-performing
functions. In order for such restructuring to be beneficial, it must
mimic small doses of toxin, creating the opposite effect of larger
doses. The difficulty lies in the dose, it must be adequate to jump-
start repair and overcompensation mechanisms, but not be so large
as to overwhelm and destroy such mechanisms, or create paradoxical
effects where small doses causes damage that cannot be repaired.
3. Restructuring that builds on strengths or refocuses the organization
toward areas of potential strength. This stage will result in overcom-
pensation to increase the organisation’s defence mechanisms,
change its shape to be more responsive, improve its resource utilisa-
tion, and/or increase or improve its speed, quality, internal charac-
ter, external image, or whatever is required to raise the competitive
nature of the organization beyond the level of its rivals.
4. Adaptation that results in a more robust, more efficient, and more
competitive organization, which is often quantified through in-
creased profitability and/or growth.
The above actions and/or circumstances may be seen as responses to
real or perceived threats and attacks. In some instances these hormetic
effects could be initiated by an astute manager in preparation for a preda-
tory ‘attack’, before a launch into a new market, or in response to a new
entrant into an existing market. Cultural robustness and strong visionary
leadership appear to be common elements in these processes regardless of
the form in which these hormetic effects occur. An organization that fails
to demonstrate hormetic capability places itself in a vulnerable position.
R. J. Pech
212
12
Dose-Response: An International Journal, Vol. 4 [2014], Iss. 3, Art. 5
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dose_response/vol4/iss3/5
CONCLUSION
In the introduction the question was asked, can a literal comparison be
made between biological phenomena in organisms and phenomena in
human organizations? The evidence provided by simplified but useful
examples appears to suggest that a phenomenon simulating hormesis can
and does occur in an organizational context. It has been possible to iden-
tify similarities between stress response behaviors of organisms with stress
response behaviors in organizations. Cellular stress response mechanisms
stimulate and repair, as well as defend the organism against further attacks.
Organizational hormesis describes actions that stimulate the organization
by increasing its focus. Damage is repaired, and the organization is
strengthened against further attacks. The common aim for the organism as
well as the organization is to increase the probability of survival. 
Organizational hormesis appears to display some recognizable iden-
tifying traits. These traits are stimulated by direct managerial interven-
tions resulting in: 
• restructurings based on an information exchange between internal
conditions and external threats, 
• shedding of non-core functions, 
• redirection of focus and resources on core and market-responsive activ-
ities, and 
• intra-organizational cultural changes that raise the level of competitive
awareness and competitive behavior within the organization. 
These activities could be likened to biological stress response behav-
iors where the organism restructures by shedding non-critical energy-
intensive functions, developing defensive mechanisms, and subsequently
facilitating the organism’s adaptation to a changing environment. The
restructuring process is a critical step. Burke and Nelson (1997, p. 327)
provide detailed evidence of the risks and failures associated with down-
sizing and the subsequent restructuring that occurs. In the US, 89 per
cent of downsizing firms sought to reduce costs while only 46 per cent
achieved this goal. 71 per cent of firms used a downsizing strategy in an
attempt to increase productivity but only 22 per cent successfully
achieved this goal. Burke and Nelson (1997) also provide evidence that
poor restructuring can destroy careers, lower morale, reduce employee
commitment, increase stress levels, and cause ‘survivors’ to work harder
for fewer rewards (p. 328). Incidences of organizational hormesis appear
to be uncommon, perhaps because few firms are able to complete the
hormetic stages of repair and overcompensation once they have suffered
significant damage. 
Hambrick, et al (1993) found that executives who remained in the
same industry for a long period came to rely upon industry ‘recipes for
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success’, applying the same strategies over and over. This ‘habitual man-
agement’ could also explain why hormesis rarely occurs in the organiza-
tional context. The catalyst for change is often a combination between
internal and external factors—direct and indirect emergence. External
factors (resulting in indirect emergence) can include increased competi-
tion and market shifts, while internal factors (resulting in direct emer-
gence) may include an inability to recognize the need for change and/or
an inability to take appropriate actions. This may be evidenced by the low
rate of organizational survival in a competitive environment. Mische,
2001, points out that approximately one-third of the Fortune 500 compa-
nies in 1970 no longer existed in 1983. Industry recipes appear to be less
successful in a rapidly changing environment, and the use of such
‘recipes’ would also preclude the possibility of initiating hormetic effects
when the organization finds itself under attack.
It would be simplistic and foolish to pounce upon one cause and one
cure for the casualty rates suffered amongst our organizations. However,
within the context of this discussion it could be argued that information-
al asymmetry between the organization’s environment and its internal
response mechanisms will increase the probability for failure. Nutt (1999)
claims that almost half of all major decisions made in organizations fail.
This is an indictment on organizational decision processes as well those
who make the decisions. In order for hormesis to occur in the biological
context, a cell’s stress response mechanism must respond appropriately
to its chemical attacker. An overly simplistic explanation may claim that
this has resulted in an exchange of information between the toxin and
the cell, with the appropriate responses occurring as a consequence of
what the toxic information is ‘telling’ the cell. The cell will only survive if
it makes and implements the ‘right’ decisions.
The examples of Canon and Hewlett-Packard as well as the recent
turnaround experienced at Xerox demonstrate that the ‘stressed’ organ-
ization only succeeds after dramatic restructuring, often driven by one
individual who is at the hub of the external/internal information nexus.
This person is then in a position to initiate changes that could be
described as restructuring through overcompensation and adaptation,
resulting in a subsequent increase in fitness to pursue the organiza-
tion’s—often new—goals. Hormesis in the biological context requires an
information exchange that triggers appropriate response mechanisms.
Similarly, in the organizational context, if the informational exchange
fails to occur or fails to elicit appropriate responses, hormetic effects will
not occur. It is apparent that the restructuring efforts of these individuals
often have the opposite effects to what is expected, with observers declar-
ing that the firm will be destroyed by such actions.
Although further research is required to study the specific details of
hormetic effects in organizations, it may be argued that one of the key
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elements for initiating such healing phenomena resides in the organiza-
tion’s culture. Culture is communicated through the behavioral and deci-
sion scaffolds that differentiate one organization from another. A respon-
sive culture that is information hungry, evoking timely and well-consid-
ered decisions with appropriate actions will be more likely to survive in a
rapidly changing environment. Rogers and Blenko (2005) point out that
‘one sign of a strong, effective culture is that everyone in the company
understands what to do without being told’ (p. 140). This statement may
have biological parallels at the cellular level as the intricate networks of
organelles within a cellular structure are required to work cooperatively
when a stress response is evoked.
The organization that is capable of working together, knowing what
to do when under ‘attack’, and which is capable of initiating hormetic
effects, should find that its level of fitness and its chances for future sur-
vival will exceed the survival rates of ‘non-hormetic’ competitors inhabit-
ing the same environment. The challenge lies in the ability to balance the
dose-response equation. How much ‘toxic’ exposure will be beneficial
and in what form and ratio should it be administered?
This paper has focused on hormesis in an organizational context.
Examples of strategies for restructuring organizations and mention of
issues related to change management have been abbreviated and simpli-
fied to enable a greater focus for a hormetic-related discussion. For more
detailed information on the right and wrong ways to restructure an
organization, see Burke and Nelson (1997), Hayes, (2002), Palmer, et al,
(2006), and Pech (2006).
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